Crowded Coalitions:
How Demographics, Ideology, and Issue Priorities Divide and Sustain the Contemporary American Parties[*]

Ryan Bakker
Department of Political Science, University of Georgia
rbakker@uga.edu

Christopher Hare
Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis
cdhare@ucdavis.edu

Robert N. Lupton
Department of Political Science, University of Connecticut
robert.lupton@uconn.edu

Keith T. Poole
Department of Political Science, University of Georgia
ktpoole@uga.edu

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Abstract

Previous political polarization scholarship analyzes differences between the parties at the elite and mass levels, but far less attention has been afforded to internal party fractures in the contemporary American electorate. In this paper, we use a mixture modeling approach to analyze the nature and extent of demographic, policy and value cleavages between and within partisans in the mass public. The method we employ does not impose a typology on the data, but rather estimates a classification of voters that maximizes the internal homogeneity of the classes. Consistent with prevailing theories of party coalitions, our results indicate that six latent classes—three for each party—are necessary to model American voters' diverse characteristics and political views. Moreover, in accordance with recent work documenting the two major parties' structural asymmetries, we show that Republican fissures are ideologically driven, whereas demographic characteristics most divide Democrats.

1 Introduction

Institutional and behavioral factors explain the American two-party system's resiliency. Electoral systems influence the number of electorally viable parties in a given political system (Cox, 1997), and plurality, or "winner-take-all" systems (as in the United States), promote the existence of two-party competition (Benoit, 2001; Duverger, 1954; Singer, 2013; Singh, 2012).[1]. Additionally, ballot restrictions, campaign finance laws and the presidency act as additional barriers to entry for minor parties (Aldrich and Lee, 2016; Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus, 1984). The behavioral response to these institutional features buttresses the American two-party system, as partisan loyalties either to the Democratic or Republican parties are formed early, are tremendously durable and serve as the primary heuristic that voters use to process political information and formulate voting decisions (Campbell et al., 1960; Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus, 2013; Green, Palmquist and Shickler, 2002).

Hence, despite growing numbers of self-described independents in the electorate and regular predictions from political pundits that a third party's emergence is either needed or on the horizon, no such scenario has come to fruition in modern American politics. However, these empirical trends and predictions for change are based upon a reasonable premise: Two parties are almost certainly too few to accommodate the diversity of interests and attitudes that exist in the American mass public. Both the Democratic and Republican parties have been characterized as "big tents," often assembling a peculiar set of groups in their electoral coalitions. Consequently, the parties are perpetually roiled—sometimes destructively so—by internal divisions.

In this paper, we endeavor to gain a better understanding of the nature of internal party divisions in the contemporary American electorate. Our approach differs from efforts like the Pew Research Center's Political Typology,[2] which divides voters into eight pre-defined groups. Instead,

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[1]These effects are both mechanical and psychological (Blais et al., 2011; Fiva and Folke, forthcoming). That is, beyond the mechanical impact of the electoral formula translating votes into seats, plurality voting rules exert psychological effects on parties and voters that discourage third parties from competing for, and gaining, elected office due to spoiler effects.

[2]See http://www.people-press.org/2017/10/24/political-typology-reveals-deep-fissures-on-the-right-and-left/.

we use a form of mixture modeling known as latent class analysis (LCA) to group respondents into blocs, or classes, based upon individuals' response patterns to a series of demographic, issue attitude and core value questions. The classes are not defined *a priori*, but instead are estimated to maximize homogeneity across the variables within each of the classes.

This approach allows us to assess both the number and characteristics of each party's coalitions in the mass public. That is, we hope to identify empirically, for the first time, the *specific* demographics, issues and values that internally divide the major party coalitions, and how such intra-party cleavages overlie one another. Our analysis includes questions designed explicitly to capture potential internal party divisions using items that do not appear on standard public opinion surveys. Namely, we solicit respondents' attitudes toward salient issues such as police militarization, government surveillance and religious conscience protections for opponents of abortion and same-sex marriage. In all, we fit a latent class model to 74 demographic, values and policy variables, allowing us to reveal intra-party divisions that heretofore have been undetected in empirical examinations of traditional public opinion data.

We then use the estimated classes to test the "parties as coalitions" theory at the mass level (Bawn et al., 2012; Karol, 2009; Noel, 2013). In this view, parties are best understood as "coalitions of groups with intense preferences on issues managed by politicians" (Karol, 2009, p. 7). This theory infers that each group within a larger party coalition should place greater priority on issues on which members are aligned with their respective party—if and when coalitional priorities differ, then we should observe these differences on issues that each faction finds less salient. We test this proposition by examining how respondents' issue priorities vary by latent class both across and, importantly, within parties.

Our findings show that six latent classes—three for each party—are needed to account for observed heterogeneity among Democratic and Republican survey respondents. The differences among the Democratic classes are primarily demographic, although the party is not absent policy divisions: One class is predominantly white, educated and affluent; a second class is mostly non-white, less educated and poorer. A third Democratic class encompasses respondents who

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are younger, more politically apathetic and libertarian, favoring social liberalism and economic conservatism. The Republican classes capture the familiar divide between ideologically consistent conservatives and those who are economically conservative but socially liberal. However, the analysis also reveals a sizable class of downscale, politically apathetic Republicans who are economically liberal but socially and symbolically conservative, resembling individuals who Ellis and Stimson (2012) label "conflicted conservatives." The results thus show that Democrats are divided largely according to the issue priorities of the diverse social groups—racial, class and religious–known to comprise the Democratic Party coalition. On the other hand, the Republican Party appears to be composed of distinct ideological factions. These empirical findings are consistent with the theory of asymmetric polarization, which documents the fundamental structural and motivational differences of the two major party coalitions (Grossmann and Hopkins, 2016).

Our results also provide mass-level support for the "parties as coalitions" theory That is, although members of the four ideologically inconsistent classes–our operationalization of the blocs constituting the major American parties–are most likely to defect from their party in House, Senate and presidential voting, all six classes prioritize issues on which they are ideologically closer to their party. This novel finding in the context of our rigorous examination of internal party divisions helps explain the durability of the major parties' current ideological configuration: Although four of the six latent classes maintain clearly cross-pressured policy views, these classes attach little importance to issues on which they disagree with their party. Ultimately, this paper contributes to the party coalitions, public opinion and voting behavior literatures by providing a fuller and more detailed portrait of the nature and extent of intra-party cleavages in the American electorate, which—although visible, consequential and integral to prevailing theories of political parties—are too often overlooked in current debates regarding polarization.

2 Party Coalitions in American Politics

The two-party system requires American political parties to assemble broad electoral coalitions—always diverse, sometimes vulnerable—of interests and identities. In Aldrich's (2011) influential view, parties are a solution to a series of collective action problems confronting both politicians and activists. Parties, then, continually struggle to resolve the tradeoff between ideological purity and electoral viability, an especially pressing concern under plurality voting rules that disincentivize niche parties Cox (1997). The Democratic and Republican parties generally have been successful in uniting numerous and disparate actors under broad ideological tenets that change—at most—only glacially over time. For the better part of the last century, for example, the Democratic Party has emphasized social justice and an extended understanding of equality, whereas the Republican Party has stressed the value of free enterprise and traditional social norms and family structures (Gerring, 1998). Of course, parties' adoption of stable ideologies, or "brands," to connect candidates competing for office to voters does not necessitate that all coalition members share similar attitudes (Aldrich, 2011).

Indeed, recent scholarship recasting parties as extended networks of activists, interest groups and elected officials—the "parties as coalitions" theory—provides another explanation for the promulgation of party brands (Bawn et al., 2012; Cohen et al., 2008; Karol, 2009; Noel, 2012, 2013; Nyhan and Montgomery, 2015). This network theory of parties views intense and diverse entrepreneurs, or "policy demanders," as the drivers of major party platforms and nomination contests. These policy demanders, although interested in winning elections, are not solely, or perhaps even mostly, involved in politics for this purpose. Rather, each group of policy demanders seeks to use government to achieve its preferred end, which often means realizing a much narrower ideological vision than a "catch all" party realistically could espouse (Bawn et al., 2012). In this account, policy demanders must form broader coalitions by agreeing to agitate on behalf of each other's policy goals—similar to Aldrich's (2011) "long coalitions" formed to create stable logrolls in Congress, but at the activist level (Noel, 2012; Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein, 2010). Thus, in order to become sufficiently strong to recruit candidates and pressure them to pursue particular

agendas, activists maintaining diverse attitudes, identities and interests are wedded under the same ideological banner. Bawn et al. (2012, p. 574) incisively describe the purpose of this often unrelated and nonintuitive marriage of activists: "The conservative and liberal ideologies help the groups define the terms of their cooperation; they also promote the useful fiction that everyone in the coalition wants the same things." "Liberal" Democrats and "conservative" Republicans are therefore inherently amalgams of distinct policy demanders who possess different priorities and preferences. The extended network theory of parties underscores why we should expect intra-party diversity in the U.S., and other work, notably that documenting the asymmetric nature of the parties, offers clues regarding the form that these intra-party divisions might take.

Scholars long have identified organizational and structural differences between the Democratic and Republican parties (e.g., Freeman, 1986). For example, surveys of mass public party identifiers show that Democrats, relative to Republicans, conceptualize and talk about politics in terms of group benefits rather than abstract principles relating to the liberal-conservative ideological continuum (Grossmann and Hopkins, 2014; Hagner and Pierce, 1982). Similarly, Democratic elite communication mostly emphasizes specific policies and proposals promising to alleviate group suffering and ameliorate societal inequalities that disproportionately harm particular groups. This rhetorical focus on social groups and targeted governmental action extends from campaign advertising (Rhodes and Johnson, 2014) and claimed electoral mandates (Azari, 2014) to campaign speeches and party platforms (Grossmann and Hopkins, 2015b, 2016; Jordan and Schoenherr, 2016). These findings regarding identifiers' orientation toward politics and elites' rhetorical strategy are sensible given the myriad historically oppressed and underrepresented groups—racial minorities, women, environmentalists, the poor, LGBT persons, Jews, labor union members and immigrants among them—that constitute and animate the Democratic Party coalition. What implications does the party's group-based constitution have for potential internal party friction?

One possibility is that the interests and identities of these diverse groups conflict, which we have sometimes observed in real-world policy debates. For instance, in general terms, carbon

taxes divide the poor and environmentalists, immigration divides union members and immigrants and gay marriage divides religious blacks and Latinos, respectively, and LGBT persons. However, conflict among these groups is generally minimized because they all largely share attitudes toward the most prominent source of elite political competition: the government's role in the economy and the size and scope of the social welfare state (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). Indeed, the Democratic Party's brand signals first and foremost a commitment to government action to bolster social programs across an array of issues ranging from infrastructure projects to public schools to unemployment insurance and healthcare, all policies that enjoy majority support among the constellation of social groups comprising the party (Grossmann and Hopkins, 2015*a*, 2016). As a result of this consensus attitude toward the basic role of government in society, coalitional horse trading is easier and issue conflict is relatively minimal. Indeed, the largest source of internal party conflict appears to be issue priorities. That is, tension among the political left mostly centers on the question of which group's oppression is in greatest need of remedy (Marietta, 2012). Our theory of intra-party divisions thus leads us to hypothesize that Democratic Party cleavages align with the racial, class and religious social groups comprising the party.

The Republican Party's structure and ideological brand leads us to expect different sources of internal division. Namely, although the Democratic social group coalition broadly agrees with the party's activist government posture, the "three-legged stool" of economic, social and foreign policy conservatism creates obvious ideological rifts among Republican identifiers. No clear logical connection exists between economic conservatism and cultural conservatism, for example, and a substantial party faction–libertarians–argue that this attitudinal configuration is illogical: In this view, support for limited government should necessitate a platform that is economically conservative and socially liberal. Additionally, Polsby (1978) introduced the terms "Main Street Republicans" and "Wall Street Republicans" to capture the divide between lower and middle-class Republicans who combine traditionalist moral values and a belief in self-dependency (Main Street Republicans), on the one hand, and upper-class, cosmopolitan Republicans who maintain economically conservative but socially progressive attitudes, on the other. The Tea

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Party represents yet another distinct faction in the Republican Party, one that appears to combine conservative positions on both economic and social issues with a highly anti-establishment posture (Hare and Poole, 2014).

Further, Ellis and Stimson (2012) identify a stable and sizable portion of the electorate who self-identity as conservatives but nonetheless maintain liberal issue attitudes. These "conflicted conservatives" endorse Republicans' symbolic belief in small government and fiscal responsibility, but yet support increased spending on most individual government spending programs. All of these documented internal ideological divisions involve Republican identifiers' varying commitment to movement conservatism–the demand for party members to adopt consistently conservative attitudes across the socioeconomic and cultural policy domains (Grossmann and Hopkins, 2015a). Despite consistent Republican rhetoric emphasizing conservative ideological abstractions (e.g., Azari, 2014; Grossmann and Hopkins, 2015a,b; Rhodes and Johnson, 2014), as well as Republican identifiers' greater awareness and use of ideological labels compared to Democrats (Grossmann and Hopkins, 2015b; Hagner and Pierce, 1982; Lelkes and Sniderman, 2016), the ever greater push toward consistently conservative policy positions among party activists seemingly has fractured the GOP coalition (Lupton, Myers and Thornton, 2017).[3] Following Bawn et al. (2012), we argue that Republicans' emphasis on rhetorical symbolism, rather than policy specifics, reflects a form of coalition maintenance in which party elites message abstractly in order to avoid exacerbating party members' ideological differences. Thus, we expect Republican Party cleavages to be more ideologically oriented and issued-based relative to those of their Democratic counterparts.

Ordinary observation of American politics and existing empirical evidence therefore similarly demonstrate that the modern Democratic and Republican parties are far from homogenous, but current scholarly analyses of intra-party conflict have tended to focus on single issues or created typologies that are reasonable but user-defined and arbitrary. As Reiter (2004, p. 251) argues, "While some political scientists have spun typologies of factionalism within particular parties, their methodology has often been no more sophisticated than their own observations and

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[3]Hare and Poole (2014) demonstrate that this trend is also evident in Congress, where the Republicans' rightward push actually has caused the party to exhibit more, as opposed to less, variance in roll-call voting.

hunches. Their claims may be plausible and even insightful, but they offer no methodology that is accessible to other scholars other than their own ingenuity; methodologically, they are like clever journalists."

In this paper, we use latent class analysis (LCA) to identify within-party cleavages among the American mass public. This methodological approach allows us to estimate classes of individuals who have similar responses to a set of demographic, issue attitude and core values variables, many of which have never before been included on the same public opinion survey. The only imposition on the results is that the number of classes must be set beforehand. Otherwise, the substantive meaning of the classes is not defined by the analyst, but is rather estimated by the method. This method allows us to assess—not *assume*—how specific demographic, issue and value divisions overlap to create major party factions in the American electorate. The survey and method that we adopt enables us to test our theory—built upon an existing account of coalition management and prevailing scholarly understandings of the structural differences between the Republican and Democratic parties—that Democrats are divided mostly along racial, class and religious lines corresponding to the social groups that comprise the party, and that Republicans are more deeply divided by distinct ideological factions. We then demonstrate that the party coalitions, despite their substantial differences and disagreements, are bound by shared issue priorities. In the next section, we formally introduce the method used to test our theory and provide the richest scholarly account to date of intra-party cleavages in American politics.

3 A Mixture Modeling Approach to the Study of Party Cleavages

Conceptually, we might imagine that there exist some number of voter "types" in the electorate, and that the differences between the groups reveal themselves through a series of variables. These variables might include measures of policy attitudes and demographic characteristics, for instance. We contend that mixture modeling is an ideal method to recover such a typology of voters from

public opinion survey data.

Mixture models treat the distribution of observed data as arising probabilistically from a mixture of component distributions. Each observation i $(i = 1, \ldots, n)$ is modeled as belonging to component distribution r $(r = 1, \ldots, R)$ with probability ϕ_{ir}, where (in finite mixture models) $\sum_{r=1}^{R} \phi_{ir} = 1$. For instance, in one popular application of mixture modeling, stock market returns are modeled as a mixture of two component distributions relating to "normal" and "crash" periods. Mixture modeling is especially useful in the social sciences because it is almost always unrealistic to that the observed behavior or choices of voters, legislators, states, etc. is generated based on their membership in only a single latent group.

In this paper, we employ a class of parametric finite mixture models known as latent class analysis (LCA) models. LCA models have been used in political science to identify and interpret clusters or latent classes of political actors (e.g., Blaydes and Linzer, 2008; Blaydes and Grimmer, 2013; Gross and Manrique-Vallier, 2012; Weber and Federico, 2013). For instance, McCutcheon (1985) uses LCA to conclude that four classes are needed to model Americans' tolerance attitudes: a group that is tolerant of both the left and right, a group that is intolerant of both the left and right, a group that is intolerant of the left and a group that is tolerant of the right. The classes group respondents with similar patterns together, even if we cannot directly observe the classes themselves. In this sense, LCA shares a close connection to other latent variable models in political science (such as item response theory and Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) NOMINATE model) that are used to estimate unobservable variables such as ideology from observed choice data. The major difference is that LCA methods treat the latent variable as categorical rather than continuous.

In order to study party cleavages by assessing the number and meaning of classes needed to categorize voters in the contemporary American electorate, we estimate the LCA model developed and implemented in the R package poLCA by Linzer (2011) and Linzer and Lewis (2011). In this model, let individual i's response to categorical variable j $(j = 1, \ldots, J)$ with K_j categories be denoted with Y_{ijk}. $Y_{ijk} = 1$ if individual i provides the kth response to variable j, and 0

otherwise. Let π_{jrk} represent the probability that an individual belonging to class r responds to variable j with response category k, and let ϕ_r represent the weight or mixing proportion of class r. The log likelihood function to be maximized by the latent class model is:

$$\ln \mathcal{L} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \ln \sum_{r=1}^{R} \phi_r \prod_{j=1}^{J} \prod_{k=1}^{K_j} (\pi_{jrk})^{Y_{ijk}} \tag{1}$$

Our primary interest is the number of classes (R) needed to model survey respondents' response patterns, the mixing proportions or the relative sizes of the R classes (ϕ_r), and, in order to determine the substantive meaning of the latent classes, the probabilities that respondents in class r will provides response k to each of the Jth variables (π_{jrk}). The number of latent classes to be estimated must be set beforehand, but the optimal number of classes can be determined by comparing the statistical fit of configurations with different numbers of classes.

4 Identifying and Understanding Party Factions in the Contemporary American Electorate

In this section, we fit the latent class model described above to a set of 74 variables from a 1,000-respondent module of the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). These variables—detailed in Appendix A.4—span demographic characteristics such as race, income and education; partisan and ideological identification; policy attitudes on economic, cultural and foreign policy issues; and core values and beliefs such as religiosity, postmaterialism and what constitutes morally acceptable behavior. Critically, respondents are also asked a battery of items designed to capture intra-party cleavages arising from attitudes toward issues such as police militarization, energy exploration, the trade-offs involved in providing federal funds to religious charity organizations lacking homosexual anti-discrimination policies, free trade, the use of military drones, whether health care is a human right and raising the minimum wage. We

argue that these questions will better allow us to discern nascent divisions among Democratic and Republican respondents. When multiple questions measure the same underlying concept–for instance, church attendance and frequency of prayer both measure religiosity–we create summated rating scales and divide respondents into quartiles based on their scores. To continue the example, **religiosityQ4** indicates that a respondent is in the most religious quartile of respondents. On issues attitudes, higher quartiles correspond to more right-wing attitudes, so **abortionQ4** means a respondent is in the most conservative quartile of respondents on the issue of abortion.

Consistent with Weber and Federico (2013), we find that at least six latent classes are needed to account for the observed heterogeneity in these data. We provide detailed fit statistics in Appendix A.1, but important to note is that we find a continued (though slowing) improvement in fit as we move from one to six classes.[4] By the time we reach six classes, the rate of decline in both the AIC and BIC fit statistics is nearly flat, and thus we are comfortable in proceeding with a six-class configuration as a useful model of the most prevalent internal cleavages present in both parties.

4.1   Demographic and Ideological Differences among the Latent Classes

We next examine response probabilities in order to interpret the substantive meaning of the six latent classes. The response probabilities (the π_{jrk} term from Equation 1) represent the probability that a given member of the class will provide a certain response to the variable. For example, they show the probability that a member of Class 1 will identify as a Republican. We present response probabilities for the 39 variables we believe best illustrate latent class differences in Figures 1-2.[5] The numbers shown in the ellipses represent the probability that a given member

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[4]We cannot estimate more than six latent classes because we run into the problem of negative degrees of freedom. That is, with more than six latent classes, the number of parameters to estimate is greater than the number of observations. To address this problem, we estimate configurations of one through ten classes using a bootstrapping approach, randomly selecting 45 of the 74 variables from the 2014 CCES (without replacement) in 100 separate trials. The calculated fit statistics are also provided in Appendix A.1, and they confirm that the AIC/BIC values flatten or even begin to increase by the time we reach six classes.

[5]Response probability plots for all variables are provided in Appendix A.4, and the full question wording for all variables appearing on the 2014 CCES used in this analysis is located in Appendix A.5. The response probabilities for all 74 variables confirm the distinguishing characteristics of the classes that we discuss in this section.

of the corresponding class listed on the x-axis provides the corresponding response on the y-axis. For instance, the bottom left corner of Figure 1 indicates that a member of Class 1 has an 86% probability of identifying as a Democrat. The values in parentheses below the class labels ("c1," "c2," etc.) represent the proportion of respondents falling into each of the classes. Class 3 is the largest class, containing 24% of respondents, whereas Class 5, containing 8% of respondents, is the smallest class.

Figures 1-2 decisively evidence that the first three latent classes, especially Class 1, are predominantly Democratic, whereas the last three latent classes, especially Class 6, are predominantly Republican. Classes 1-3 overwhelmingly identify as Democrats, voted for President Obama in 2012, believe health care is a basic human right and support raising the minimum wage. Conversely, Classes 4-6 predominantly identify as Republicans and symbolic conservatives, voted for Mitt Romney in 2012, believe we should expand oil, coal and natural gas production, are opposed to raising taxes to create a universal health care system, are pro-life and support the military's use of drone strikes. Moreover, we observe that all three Democratic classes are majority female, which is true of only one Republican class (Class 4), testifying to the enduring gender gap in American politics (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier, Boef and Lin, 2004; Ondercin, 2017). Here, we observe expected distinctions between the parties, or the two sets of latent classes that distinguish Democrats from Republicans.

However, also readily apparent is that many—indeed, most—of the variables reveal differences across classes with the Democratic and Republican Parties, which are masked in traditional studies investigating partisan polarization. Among the Democratic classes, Class 1 members are largely liberal, white, educated, affluent, secular, cosmopolitan—i.e., likely to travel and be culturally adventurous—and postmaterialist, or more concerned about values than material concerns in political life. Indeed, Class 1 members are by far the least likely to believe that large retail stores are good for local communities, a statement supported by majorities in all other classes. Additionally, Class 1 members exhibit consistently liberal issue attitudes across the economic, cultural and foreign policy domains. They are also the class most opposed to free trade, expanding

traditional energy production and police militarization. Class 1 is perhaps exceptionally distinct in its liberal views on immigration, as its members' probability of believing that immigrants are a burden is only 8%, compared to $56\%\text{-}89\%$ for the other five classes.

In contrast, Class 2 is predominantly non-white, economically downscale and politically uninformed and uninvolved. Class 2 is also the most religious, least postmaterialist and second least cosmopolitan of the classes. Class 2 members are about as liberal as Class 1 members in their attitudes toward economic issues like raising the minimum wage, health care and government assistant for the needy. However, we observed marked differences on social and—to a lesser extent—foreign policy issues between Class 1 and Class 2 members. Class 2 members are fairly socially conservative: more likely to believe that euthanasia and homosexuality are immoral, that marriage and children should be a priority and that gay marriage and abortion should be illegal. Several of the more nonconventional questions also divide Class 1 and Class 2 members, as Class 2 members are more supportive of expanding traditional energy production, large retail stores and police militarization than Class 1 members.

This ideological divide along the cultural policy dimension among mostly white Class 1 members and majority black and Latino Class 2 members is consistent with previous research highlighting the importance of religion to blacks and Latinos (McKenzie, 2004; McKenzie and Rouse, 2013; Putnam and Campbell, 2010), as well as to the differential effects of religiosity on partisanship and issue attitudes among whites versus the other two groups. Despite a strong relationship to socially conservative attitudes, religiosity has not been as strongly associated with Republican partisanship among Latinos (Gibson and Hare, 2012; Kelly and Morgan, 2008) as it has for whites, and it is associated with a general leftward shift for blacks (McDaniel and Ellison, 2008). Moreover, religious commitment is associated with liberal social welfare policies among blacks–who comprise over 40% of Class 2 members–including policies designed to assist the less fortunate (McKenzie and Rouse, 2013). As McDaniel and Ellison (2008, p. 189) note, "The enthusiasm for conservative social and moral values–which is very real among many African Americans–is offset by the appeal of Democratic policies concerning educational access and economic opportunity,

health care, support for the poor, and other issues of paramount concern to these voters." These findings suggest that widespread attitudinal agreement between Class 1 and Class 2 members on economic issues are sufficiently salient to prevent minority defection from the Democratic Party despite their social policy disagreements with Class 1 members, not to mention additional divisions on more nonconventional issues involving the benefits of traditional energy production, large retail stores and police militarization.

The last of the Democratic classes—Class 3—is more politically apathetic, younger and fairly secular. It has the highest proportion of self-identified moderates of any class, but still broke overwhelmingly for President Obama (87%) in 2012. Class 3 exhibits something of a libertarian streak: left-wing on social issues. especially on gay rights, but more centrist on economic issues like health care and government assistance for the needy. While nearly as environmentalist as Class 1, Class 3 members also support free trade and large retail stores. We suspect that Class 3 is composed of the kinds of voters that some Republican politicians and operatives think can be won over with libertarian-based appeals, particularly on foreign policy issues. For instance, Class 3 is the most resistant to the notion that the United States should play an active role in the world.

The attitudinal diversity that we observe among Democratic identifiers corresponds to the different demographic groups that comprise the party: Upper class, white professionals, ethnic and religious minorities and young people, respectively. Relative to the liberal stalwarts representing Class 1, Class 2 and Class 3 voters' policy attitudes are substantially less consistently operationally liberal than existing accounts of the character of Democratic and liberal mass opinion suggest (e.g., Ellis and Stimson, 2012; Grossmann and Hopkins, 2016. This work examines attitudes largely toward a standard battery of government spending programs. We show, however, using a much broader set of policy issues and core values that Democrats are in fact divided in their attitudes toward some less frequently asked about components of the social welfare state, and even more so toward foreign policy issues and religious values. As a result, the social identities of the various Democratic Classes might not equally adhere each one to the party, generating

greater Democratic factionalism than is appreciated in previous work. Nevertheless, consistent with previous work, Democratic factionalism appears considerably less policy-based relative to the Republican variety.

The difference between Republican Classes 5 and 6 reflect the classic intra-party divide between consistent conservatives (Class 6) and more affluent and socially liberal Republicans (Class 5). Gay rights, immigration and the environment are the issues that most separate these classes. Also noteworthy is that Class 6 is about twice as large as Class 5, underscoring the relative influence of these two groups in the Republican Party. The larger Class 6 is closely aligned with the Tea Party–its members have 92% probability of positively evaluating the Tea Party. This last finding adds to existing evidence suggesting that Tea Party supporters are not libertarians, but rather are ideologically consistent conservatives (Campbell and Putnam, 2011; Williamson, Skocpol and Coggin, 2011).

The results also reveal that the largest Republican class, Class 4, can be characterized as communitarian or populist (e.g., Carmines, Ensley and Wagner, 2015): quite socially conservative but more economically moderate. Class 4 members are between—but closer to Class 6—on the issues of gay rights, euthanasia, abortion and immigration. But they are also the furthest left of the three Republican classes on the issues of health care, whether businesses make too much profit, government assistant for the needy, the environment and the minimum wage. Demographically, Class 4 is composed of economically downscale whites with low levels of education, high levels of religiosity, and low levels of cosmopolitanism. The relative size and attitudinal inconsistency of this group—whose members' have a 65% probability of self-identifying as ideologically conservative—comports well with previous scholarship depicting a significant portion of the mass public as "conflicted conservatives" (Ellis and Stimson, 2012; Stimson, 2004). Despite these individuals' abstract antagonism toward government embodied in their symbolic identification as conservatives, they nonetheless support a host of social welfare programs and government spending policies. Moreover, Class 4's particular strain of anti-immigrant sentiment and economic populism is intriguing given President Trump's nativist, anti-party establishment posture. We

thus suspect that his large group of populist Republicans might be most likely to defect from Republican party line voting at the polls. We will investigate partisan voting levels across all six classes in the 2014 House and Senate midterm elections, as well as in the 2012 presidential election, but first we will explore how well each class that we have described in this section maps onto a two-dimensional ideological space composed of separate economic and cultural dimensions. [6]

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[6]We replicate these classes using 2015 CCES data. Those results, shown in Appendix A.8, are consistent with our theoretical expectations regarding party defection: Class 4 Republicans were the most likely of the three Republican classes to support anti-establishment outsider Donald Trump in the 2016 GOP primary campaign.

Figure 1: Probabilities of political and demographic responses given latent class membership. Class population shares in parentheses.

2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
Issue Attitudes

Figure 2: Probabilities of issue responses given latent class membership. Class population shares in parentheses.

In order to examine how the estimated class configuration maps onto a two-dimensional ideological space composed of separate economic and cultural dimensions, we estimated 2014 CCES respondents' positions on these two dimensions using an ordinal item response theory (IRT) model (Quinn, 2004; see also Treier and Hillygus, 2009). Economic scores are estimated using responses to eleven issue attitude questions concerning healthcare, government spending, environmental regulation, the minimum wage and free trade; cultural scores are estimates using responses to ten issue attitude questions concerning gun control, immigration, LGBT rights and the desired role of religion and religious conscience protections. The scores are normalized and scaled such that higher values indicate more conservative attitudes.

If the classes successfully capture ideological divisions between voters across the two dimensions, then we should observe distinct clusters of respondents corresponding to latent class membership. Figure 3 shows precisely this configuration. Class 1 and Class 6 members are clustered in the consistent liberal and conservative quadrants of the space, respectively. Class 2 Democrats' social conservatism relative to their Class 1 counterparts is also evident. Class 3 and Class 4 are both economically centrist, but diverge on cultural issues: Class 3 members trend socially liberal while Class 4 members tend to be further right on cultural issues. Class 5 members lie between Class 4 and Class 6 members on economic issues, but the former are also the most socially liberal of the Republican groups. To the extent there are truly libertarian–right-wing on economic issues and left-wing on social issues–respondents, they are mostly dispersed between Classes 3, 4, and 5.

The results in this section mapping the six classes comprising the major party coalitions comports with previous work showing that related, yet distinct social welfare and cultural issues underlie mass opinion (e.g., Feldman and Johnston, 2014; Layman and Carsey, 2002; Stimson, 2004; Treier and Hillygus, 2009). That is, our evidence reveals that citizens maintain coherent attitudes toward issues within those two broad policy domains, but that, as a wealth of existing scholarship shows, the nature and strength of the connections among issue attitudes between domains varies widely across individuals (e.g., Converse, 1964; Jacoby, 1995; Jewitt and Goren,

2016; Lupton, Myers and Thornton, 2015). Indeed, the plots presented in Figure 3 confirm the LCA results indicating that the percentage of ideologically consistent liberals and conservatives in the American electorate is rather limited. More broadly, that the mapping of individuals' policy positions onto a two-dimensional economic and cultural issue space precisely replicates–using a different method––the configuration of the six classes identified in the previous section reassures us that we have uncovered genuine and distinct groups of Democratic and Republican voters. We next turn toward examining the behavioral consequences of these intra-party divisions in the mass public, as well as the issue priorities that create resilient parties in the face of considerable internal discord.

2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study

Figure 3: Ideological positions of respondents by latent class membership. Darker cells indicate greater densities, with mean scores for each class marked with a "+."

4.2 Predicting Party Defections from Latent Class Membership

If our model is useful and our understanding of the latent classes is correct, then latent class membership should predict vote choice—specifically, party defection—in presidential and congressional

elections. To test this behavioral implication of our model, we estimate a series of probit models in which Republican vote choice for president in 2012 and in House and Senate elections in 2014 is regressed onto dummy variables for the six predicted classes.[7] We also include seven-point party identification as a predictor in these models to eliminate the possibility class differences in the probability of casting a Republican vote are simply a product of partisan imbalances across classes.

Figure 4 shows the predicted probabilities of Republican vote choice for members of each of the six latent classes with 90% credible intervals, controlling for partisanship. Consistent with expectations, Class 2 and 3 members are more likely than Class 1 members to defect and vote Republican, and Class 4 and Class 5 members are more likely than Class 6 members to defect and vote Democratic. Interestingly, both sets of classes are about equally likely to defect, with the exception that Class 4 members—the "conflicted" conservative populists who support key components of the social welfare state despite maintaining culturally and symbolically conservative attitudes—are more likely than Class 5 members to vote for the Democratic candidate in House and Senate races in 2014. The higher likelihood of party defection among Class 4 Republicans is particularly noteworthy because these voters are most likely to have supported anti-establishment candidate Donald Trump in the 2016 GOP primary election. These voters—who recall constitute the largest Republican class—might then hold the key to understanding the party's current zeitgeist that is sharply at odds with programmatic conservatism. Additionally, the significant differences in levels of predicted partisan voting among the Democratic classes is also significant because the evidence suggests that a broadly shared desire for greater government involvement in the economy might not unify the party as much as previously suspected, especially among more libertarian Class 3 members. Overall, the results suggest that our latent class configuration in fact represents behaviorally consequential cleavages in both parties that lead some partisans to defect, a remarkable finding against the backdrop of an extremely polarized political environment in which partisan voting is at or near record highs (e.g., Bafumi and Shapiro, 2009; Hetherington,

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[7]Class 1 is omitted as the reference category.

2001; Smidt, 2017). The evidence adds to our belief that we have identified real and relevant demographic, value and issue cleavages that internally divide the two major American political parties. We aspire in the next section to understand how co-partisans' shared issue priorities hold the parties together in the presence of these serious internal cleavages.

2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study

Figure 4: Predicted probabilities of vote choice by latent class membership, controlling for partisanship. 90% credible intervals shown.

4.3 Issue Priorities: Do "Parties in the Electorate" Function as Coalitions?

One puzzle is that the preceding analysis—namely, Figure 3—demonstrates that the classes represent fairly ideologically distinct clusters. Nonetheless, even in the face of policy cross-pressures, Classes 2–5 exhibit tremendous partisan loyalty. They are much more likely to defect relative to Class 1 or 6 members, but still quite unlikely to do so overall. These findings can be resolved with a "parties as coalitions" understanding (Bawn et al., 2012), but *only* if members of the cross-pressured groups attach greater importance to the issues on which they are aligned with their respective party. If the parties are indeed coalitions of diverse policy demanders, then the various interests comprising them should share sufficient common priorities to sustain a long-term alliance. We can test this theory using a measure of issue salience that is available from a

separate module of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) conducted in 2015.

The 2015 CCES asked respondents to rank the top four issues of greatest personal importance to them from a list of fourteen issues. We map the estimated class configuration from the 2014 CCES onto the 2015 CCES using 25 common items included in both surveys.[8] Using the class conditional probabilities for these items from the 2014 CCES result, we can place respondents in the 2015 CCES in the six latent classes. This step allows us not only to bring additional variables into our analysis, but also to test our interpretation of the substantive meaning of the classes and externally validate the results. We demonstrate in Appendix A.2 that response patterns across an array of items—e.g., candidate and group feeling thermometers, core value batteries and open-ended political self-descriptions—replicate our prior interpretation of the latent classes.

Figure 5 shows the proportion of 2015 CCES respondents in each class who ranked the issue as one of the four most important issues to them in deciding which candidate to support.[9] Although we see substantial issue priority differences across classes, the priorities generally serve to reinforce the major parties' current ideological configuration. We conclude based upon the results across both parties that to the extent that the "parties in the electorate" are policy demanders, they are widely focused on issues on which they are in agreement with their latent class's preferred party.[10]

For example, among the three Democratic classes, the largest issue salience differences are between Class 1, on the one hand, and Classes 2 and 3, on the other. Members of Class 1 attach much greater importance to income inequality and cultural issues such as abortion, the environment and gay rights. Members of Classes 2 and 3 view issues like unemployment, as well as potentially cross-cutting issues like the debt, immigration and taxes, as more important. The

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[8]A list of the common items appearing on the 2014 and 2015 CCES used in this analysis is provided in Appendix A.6 and the bridging code is provided in Appendix A.7.

[9]The exact question wording is: "Usually there is no candidate who shares all of our positions on the important issues facing the country. All of the issues listed below are important, but which of the following are the MOST important to you in terms of choosing which candidate you will support?"

[10]This also implies that class members who find cross-cutting issues important will be more likely to break away from their coalition (i.e., become detached from their party). We present findings in Appendix A.3 that Class 2 and Class 5 members who find economic issues less salient and Class 3 members who find economic issues more salient exhibit higher levels of partisan detachment, consistent with our results in Section 4.2.

upshot is that although these differences in issue emphasis reveal that Democrats are expressing their economic goals differently, the goals themselves appear shared. That is, the actual differences between a policy agenda based upon reducing income inequality versus one centered on unemployment and jobs is likely to be small, and the three Democratic classes all broadly agree on the importance of health care and social program spending generally. This evidence supports arguments that a shared commitment to active government unites the Democratic Party coalition, even in the absence of abstract ideological agreement among the party faithful (e.g., Bawn et al., 2012; Grossmann and Hopkins, 2016).

Among the three Republican classes, social issues are equally salient for members of populist Class 4 and the ideologically consistent Class 6 members, but the two groups diverge in the importance they attach to economic issues. In particular, to the extent that Class 4 members report economic issues as being salient, they tend to be items such as health care and spending on social programs like Social Security. We should note that Class 4 members' emphasis on these issues mirror that of Democratic classes, again suggesting that economic attitudes are the basis of these Republicans' defection at the polls. Class 5 and Class 6 members care about economic issues like the debt and taxes that aim to reduce the government's size and its role in the economy. Importantly for the parties as coalitions theory, virtually no Class 5 members—who are more liberal on cultural issues relative to the programmatic conservatives comprising Class 6—mention abortion, gay rights or morality as one of their four most important issues. Thus, although Class 5 members possess more liberal attitudes toward cultural issues relative to other Republicans, these Class 5 "Wall Street" Republicans nonetheless identify strongly with the GOP due to the centrality of economic issues both to them and the party platform. Ultimately, for all of the coalitional logrolling that must occur in order to appease the various factions within each party, the evidence presented in this section suggests that individuals' shared commitment to salient issues represent a crucial tie that binds partisans together. We conclude by reviewing the evidence marshaled in this project and consider the implications of our results for our understanding of American party politics.

2015 Cooperative Congressional Election Study

Figure 5: Salience rankings by latent class. 95% confidence intervals shown.

5 Discussion and Conclusion

Motivated by the United States's electoral system that forces hundreds of millions of citizens to choose between two major parties, previous scholarship documenting the heterogeneity of the party coalitions at the organizational and mass levels and party fractures that have riven both the Democrats and Republicans in their respective contentious recent presidential primary campaigns, we endeavored in this paper to understand better the sources, nature, extent and consequences of the internal party cleavages in the contemporary American electorate. Our novel methodological approach and comprehensive analysis of over 70 survey items that hitherto had never appeared on a single measurement instrument revealed remarkable coalitional diversity and signs of trademark resilience among the parties in the electorate. We believe that our results inform multiple strains of vibrant research in this area and contribute substantially to our knowledge of the composition

and characteristics of the major parties.

Our first primary inference was that demographic, core value and policy differences alike divide both major parties, and that these differences are sufficient to create at least six distinct classes of voters, three Democratic and three Republican. This result was obtained using a latent class analysis of survey items that we designed specifically to capture the potential breadth and depth of salient party cleavages. We found, consistent with existing evidence regarding the relative paucity of ideological constraint among the mass public, that only two small classes—one Democratic and one Republican—exhibited consistently liberal and conservative, respectively, issue attitudes (Converse, 1964; Jacoby, 1995; Stimson, 1975). We found that the remainder of the mass public can be characterized by varying combinations of social welfare and cultural beliefs and preferences, in line with much prior work testifying to the multidimensionality of mass public ideology (Feldman and Johnston, 2014; Layman and Carsey, 2002; Stimson, 2004; Treier and Hillygus, 2009). Thus, our basic finding matches the existing scholarly understanding of the structure of ideological thinking in the electorate, although the number of unique classes that we uncover within parties—and, importantly, the sources of discord and unity among them–represents a novel contribution.

Specifically, we revealed there are important demographic and policy differences within both parties, and that these differences align to create at least six latent classes of voters in the contemporary American electorate. Our unique measurement instrument and cutting-edge methodological approach enabled us to identify and explain intra-party cleavages that previously had been referenced only narratively and haphazardly. Our systematic, data-driven analysis elucidated the sources of party divisions in the electorate, which occur among both parties for different reasons, consistent with prior work documenting partisan group asymmetries (Grossmann and Hopkins, 2016). Our findings showed that Democrats primarily are divided by race, religion and age, as the party's bedrock minority constituency maintains more culturally conservative attitudes than the party's platform expresses. Similarly, their younger generation is more laissez-faire economically than the Class 1 liberal archetypes. Nonetheless, the party's attitudinal points of departure appear

smaller and less ideological relative to the Republican Party's coalition, which divides among consistent conservatives, economic conservatives who eschew the party's right-wing social plank and populists who endorse cultural conservatism and the social welfare state. These divisions accord with existing evidence of the the disconnect between Republicans' ritual commitment to abstract conservatism and operationally liberal policy attitudes at the mass (Ellis and Stimson, 2012) and elite levels (Lupton, Myers and Thornton, 2017). They may also testify to the power of various Republican factions in Congress that have limited the party's ability to implement its stated legislative agenda through President Trump's first year in the White House (e.g., Bloch Robin, 2017).

Our second key finding, which we believe most informs our scholarly understanding of the American political parties at the mass level, is that although these internal party divisions are consequential for partisan defection and detachment, the current party configuration is considerably stable. The results lend insight into the American party system's durability despite discord, occasional dysfunction and expressed dissatisfaction among mass-level party identifiers and party voters. Partisans rarely agree with their party on all, or even most, issues, but we showed in this paper they simply care the most about issues on which they agree with their partisan group; the party faithful conversely report caring less about issues on which they diverge from their party. Indeed, many of the internal divisions within the parties are not differences of positions, but differences of priorities. Cross-pressured partisans who do view divergent issues as important exhibit greater detachment from their partisan label in presidential and congressional voting. These findings represent to our knowledge the most rigorous and expansive test of the "parties as coalitions" theory to date (Bawn et al., 2012; Cohen et al., 2008; Noel, 2012, 2013). Consistent with theory, political parties are assembled groups of individuals who possess different, and sometimes competing, attitudes, beliefs and priorities. When these priorities diverge, the coalition frays, but the major parties are remarkably durable because their adherents share the salient aspects of their preferred party's platform.

Our paper necessarily suffers from limitations and raises many questions for future work.

First, although our class configuration is stable across two survey years, we wonder if the same arrangement would be recovered across different periods of party control. Similarly, would we observe the same classes in response to changing party positions on high profile issues and in times of greater or less support for one or the other party's plank? Second, given the importance of issue priorities for party commitment and party defection, what is the causal connection between these orientations? Our observational study is helpful for understanding in the first instance the relationship between policy priorities, identification and voting, but we do not know if weak partisanship or if the reverse is true. A future panel design or experiment could help untangle the temporal ordering of this association.

Moving forward, we also hope to consider how core values and other antecedent variables can be incorporated as predictors of latent class membership as part of a latent class regression model. Measures of political sophistication could also be used as a way to divide latent classes—such as Class 3 in our analysis—between politically engaged and unengaged segments, perhaps signaling how attention to, or awareness of, elite rhetoric and issue salience interact to shape party attachment or detachment. All of these and more considerations await, but we believe that this paper represents a theoretically informed, methodologically novel attempt to reveal the nature and extent of the intra-party cleavages in the American electorate.

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A Appendix

Contents

A.1 LCA Fit Statistics for the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study

Figure 6 shows the AIC (Akaike information criterion) and BIC (Bayesian information criterion) fit statistic values produced by estimating the LCA model on the 2014 CCES data with one through six latent classes. Adding latent classes will always improve model fit, but the AIC and BIC statistics penalize the inclusion of additional parameters (in this case, classes) to prevent overfitting. Lower AIC and BIC values are better, with the difference between the two being that the BIC penalizes additional parameters more harshly than the AIC. We then assess the robustness of our estimated LCA configuration to varying specifications in Figures 7–9.

2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study

Figure 6: Latent class analysis fit statistics for configurations of one through six classes.

Figure 7: Latent class analysis fit statistics for configurations of one through ten classes from 50 bootstrap trials, including 45 variables in each trial. Smoothed mean plotted in thick black line.

Figure 8: Correlations between class conditional probabilities including and omitting party identification.

2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study

Figure 9: Distribution of correlations between class conditional probabilities from full result and class conditional probabilities from 100 bootstrap trials, omitting 10 variables in each trial.

A.2 Robustness Checks: Applying Configuration to 2015 Cooperative Congressional Election Study

As a further validation check, we next apply the classification scheme estimated from the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) data to respondents in an external dataset: a module of 1,000 respondents from the 2015 CCES. The 2015 CCES incudes many of the questions included in the aforementioned 2014 CCES, but also includes batteries of survey items related to core values and beliefs, issue scales, and candidate and group feeling thermometers. Using 25 common items included in both surveys, we apply the class conditional probabilities from the 2014 CCES result in order to place respondents in the 2015 CCES in the six latent classes.[11] This allows us to test both our interpretation of the substantive meaning of the classes and the external validity of our results.

We begin by testing this approach by examining responses to an open-ended question on the 2015 CCES that asked: "When it comes to politics today, how would you describe yourself?" Table 1 details the most commonly used words by respondents by latent class (again, where respondents are classified using the 2014 CCES result based on their responses to the common items between the surveys).[12] If our interpretation of the latent classes is correct, we should expect to find phrases that correspond to respondents' predicted classes. Indeed, respondents in Class 1 are most likely to use the word "liberal" in their political self-descriptions, while there is no dominant phrase appearing in Class 2 and Class 3 self-descriptions. Class 4 through 6 members tend to use the word "conservative," though in increasing proportion. Though not widely used, the terms "progressive" and "libertarian" appear among the five most commonly used words by Class 1 and Class 5 members, respectively. It is also worth noting that the word "interested" is usually preceded by "not" or "not very," and is more common among Class 2-4 members.

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[11]A list of the common items, as well as the code used, is provided in the Appendix.

[12]We omit so-called stop words like "a/an," "the," "of," etc.

Table 1: Most commonly used words in respondents' political self-descriptions by predicted latent class. Percentages shown are proportion of members of the latent class who include the term in their response.

Class 1	Class 2	Class 3
liberal [38%]	democrat [11%]	moderate [10%]
democrat [18%]	moderate [10%]	liberal [10%]
moderate [10%]	liberal [7%]	democrat [10%]
progressive [9%]	interested [4%]	interested [8%]
independent [6%]	conservative [4%]	independent [8%]
Class 4	**Class 5**	**Class 6**
republican [19%]	conservative [36%]	conservative [57%]
conservative [17%]	independent [17%]	republican [9%]
interested [8%]	republican [14%]	independent [7%]
moderate [7%]	moderate [9%]	constitutional [4%]
independent [4%]	libertarian [7%]	moderate [3%]

Source: 2015 Cooperative Congressional Election Study

Figure 10 details the relationship between predicted class membership and responses to a set of items on the 2015 CCES. These items include respondent self-placements on three separate ideological scales (economic, social/cultural, and foreign policy), three batteries of core value questions (economic egalitarianism, moral traditionalism, and militarism), self-placements on an economic/social issue salience scale, and feeling thermometer ratings of several groups and political figures (including the difference between thermometer ratings of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton).[13] All responses are normalized and the ideological and value scores are scaled such that higher values indicate more conservative/right-wing dispositions.

The most direct test of the applicability of the class configuration from the 2014 CCES to external data from the 2015 CCES concerns two items—economic/social issue salience and Tea Party favorability—that were included in both surveys in different formats, and therefore were not included as common items used to bridge across surveys. Accordingly, the order of the classes should be the same in both years. Figure 10 shows that they are: in both the 2014 and 2015 CCES, Class 5 (Class 1) respondents are the most (least) likely to say that economic issues are more important than social issues, while Tea Party evaluations follow a Class 1-3-2-4-5-6 ordering.

Responses to the other items correspond to our interpretation of the latent classes. Class 1 members are furthest left across all items in Figure 10. Class 2 and Class 3 members are similar across issues, values, and thermometer ratings (such as labor unions and socialists) concerning economic matters, but Class 2 members are further right than both Class 1 and Class 3 members on social/cultural items. Class 5 is the most socially liberal of the Republican classes (for instance, it is to the left of even Class 2 in its thermometer ratings of evangelicals, atheists, and LGBT persons), but its members are nearly indistinguishable from Class 6 members on most economic items. Likewise, Class 4 differs most sharply from Class 5 and Class 6 on economic issues, values,

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[13]Full question wordings provided in the Appendix.

and thermometer ratings. The classes also follow the same pattern of partisan defection seen in 4 with the difference between thermometer ratings of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton increasing monotonically over the latent classes.


Figure 10: Distribution of (normalized) item scores by predicted latent class.

A.3 Issue Salience and Partisan Detachment

To the extent they attach importance to issues on which they deviate from their party, they are more likely to defect in their vote choice. If this explanation holds water, though, salience should predict party detachment when it occurs on cross-pressured issues. Namely, respondents in Classes 2 and 5 who assign more importance to social issues, and respondents in Classes 3 and 4 who assign more importance to economic issues, should exhibit greater partisan detachment since they care about issue dimensions on which they are cross pressured.

We measure partisan detachment (for each party) by creating a summated rating scale of three items: whether the respondent identifies as a strong partisan, whether they rate the Democratic/Republican party as more extreme than themselves on the liberal-conservative scale, and whether they voted for the opposite party's presidential candidate in 2012. Item responses are averaged and the resulting scores range between 0 (no detachment) and 1 (maximum detachment).[14] The detachment scores are modeled via OLS regression using economic ideology, social/cultural ideology, and the number of economic issues that respondents included in their rankings of the four most personally important issues as explanatory variables.[15]

The effects of economic issue salience on party detachment are presented in Figure 11. All salience effects except those for Class 4 are significant at $p < 0.05$, one-tailed. Consistent with our expectations, economic issue salience increases Democratic attachment among Class 2 respondents, but decreases it among Class 3 respondents. Likewise, Class 5 respondents who exclusively or nearly exclusively list economic issue as most important are more attached to the Republican Party. To the extent that these intra-party cleavages are consequential—either for short-term defections or even long-term realignments—salience appears to play a key role. The latent classes are most predictive of partisan detachment among members who view issues along the dimension on which they disagree with their party as important (see also Carsey and Layman, 2006).

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[14]Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.8$ for the Democratic Party detachment scale, 0.78 for the Republican Party detachment scale.

[15]Debt, health care, income inequality, unemployment, economic growth, spending on social programs, and taxes are treated as the economic issues.

Table 2: Predictors of partisan detachment by latent class.

	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4	Class 5
Economic conservatism	0.04	0.09*	0.01	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Social/cultural conservatism	0.12*	0.16*	0.01	−0.05
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.08)
# Economic issues ranked in top 4	−0.06*	0.06*	0.03	−0.10*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Intercept	0.52*	0.53*	0.37*	0.79*
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.15)
N	189	241	142	69
R^2	0.07	0.16	0.01	0.06
adj. R^2	0.06	0.15	−0.01	0.02
Resid. sd	0.35	0.33	0.34	0.32

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$, one-tailed.

Source: 2015 Cooperative Congressional Election Study

Figure 11: Economic issue salience and partisan disaffection by latent class. Estimates from Table 2.

A.4 List and Class Probability Plots of the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study Variables Used in the Analysis

Number of response categories and 2014 CCES variable ID in parentheses:

Political Identification and Sophistication
partyid (7, pid7)
ideology (7, CC334A)
voted2012 (2, CC14_316)
romneyvote (2, CC14_317)
teapartypositive (5, CC424)
news_interest (4, newsint)
mediause_blog (2, CC14_301_1)
mediause_newspaper (2, CC14_301_3)
knowledge_correcthousesenate (2, CC14_309a & CC14_309b)
dimensionsalience (2, UOG302)

Demographic Variables
age (4, birthyr)
female (2, gender)
education (3, educ)
black (2, race)
hispanic (2, race)
georegion (4, region)
income (4, faminc)
homeownership (2, ownhome)
stockownership (2, investor)
unionmember (2, union & unionhh)

Personal Values
religiosity.Qs (4, pew_bornagain, pew_religimp, pew_churatd, & pew_prayer)
postmaterialism (2, UOG405_1, UOG405_2, & UOG405_3)
conspiracy.Qs (4, UOG309_E, UOG309_I, UOG309_L, & UOG309_N)
cosmo.Qs (4, EurorAus, CAorMex, AsiaAforSouthAm, Indian, & Japanese)

Economic Issues
govtmorehelpneedy (4, UOG309_D)
raisetaxesuniversalhealthcare (4, UOG309_M)
repealACA (2, CC14_324_2)
refusestatehealthexpansion (2, CC14_324_3)
supportryanbudget (2, CC14_325_1)
raisedebtceiling (2, CC14_325_5)
environment.Qs (4, CC14_326_1, CC14_326_2, CC14_326_3, & CC14_326_4)
minimumwage (2, UOG304)
freetradeharmful (2, UOG407)

balancebudget_firstchoice (3, CC14_329a)
balancebudget_lastresort (3, CC14_329b)

Social Issues
guncontrol.Qs (4, CC14_320a, CC14_320b, CC14_320c, CC14_320d, & CC14_320e)
immigration.Qs (4, CC14_322_1, CC14_322_2, CC14_322_3, CC14_322_4, & CC14_322_5)
immigrantsburden (4, UOG309_A)
abortion.Qs (4, CC14_323_1, CC14_323_3, CC14_323_4, & CC14_323_5)
favorgaymarriage (2, CC14_327)
prohibitfundscharitiesdiscriminate (4, UOG309_J)
roleofchristianity (4, UOG311)
religiousconscienceprotections (3, UOG406)
supportaffirmativeaction (4, CC14_328)
racialdiscrimination (2, UOG310)
racismhigherinsouth (2, UOG403)

Foreign Policy Issues
interventionism (2, UOG307)
mistakeiraq (2, CC14_305)
troopsbackiraq (2, CC14_306)
supportlimitsnsasurveillance (2, CC14_331_2)
supportdronestrikes (4, UOG401)

Miscellaneous Issues
healthcarehumanright (4, UOG309_B)
vaccinationsautism (4, UOG309_C)
marriagechildrenpriority (4, UOG309_F)
businesstoomuchprofit (4, UOG309_G)
integratedpublichousing (4, UOG309_H)
largeretailstoresgood (4, UOG309_K)
energyproduction (2, UOG303)
policemilitarization (2, UOG305)
gmosdangerous (2, UOG402)

Moral Items
moral_euthanasia (2, UOG301_A)
moral_testanimals (2, UOG301_B)
moral_deathpenalty (2, UOG301_C)
moral_eatanimals (2, UOG301_D)
moral_pornography (2, UOG301_E)
moral_homosexuality (2, UOG301_F)
moral_stemcells (2, UOG301_G)
moral_marijuana (2, UOG301_H)

Trust in Institutions

trust_cia (5, UOG308_A)
trust_military (5, UOG308_B)
trust_supcourt (5, UOG308_C)
trust_bigbiz (5, UOG308_D)
trust_orgrelig (5, UOG308_E)
trust_unions (5, UOG308_F)

**2014 Cooperative Congressional Election
Political Identification and Sophistication**

Figure 12: Probabilities of political identification and sophistication responses given latent class membership.

**Figure 13: Probabilities of demographic responses given latent class membership.**

Figure 14: Probabilities of personal value responses given latent class membership.

2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study Economic Issues

Figure 15: Probabilities of economic issue responses given latent class membership.

Figure 16: Probabilities of social issue responses given latent class membership.

**2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study**
Foreign Policy Issues

Figure 17: Probabilities of foreign policy issue responses given latent class membership.

2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
**Miscellaneous Issues**

Figure 18: Probabilities of miscellaneous issue responses given latent class membership.

Figure 19: Probabilities of moral item responses given latent class membership.

2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
Trust in Institutions

Figure 20: Probabilities of trust in institutions responses given latent class membership.

A.5 Question Wording for the Items included in the <name omitted> Module of the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study

1. **UOG301**: Do you support or oppose the use of unmanned aerial vehicles ("drones") to kill suspected terrorists overseas?

2. **UOG302**: Next we will be showing a list of issues. Regardless of whether or not you think it should be legal, for each one, please tell me whether you personally believe that in general it is morally acceptable or morally wrong.

   (a) Doctor-assisted suicide
   (b) Using live animals in medical testing and research
   (c) The death penalty
   (d) Killing animals for food
   (e) Pornography
   (f) Gay or lesbian relations
   (g) Medical research using stem cells from human embryos
   (h) Recreational use of marijuana

3. **UOG303**: Which statement comes closer to your view? Genetically modified foods are a positive development because they are cheaper, nutritional, and more resistant to weather conditions and pests **OR** Genetically modified foods are dangerous because they are unnatural, not as healthy as organic foods, and are controlled by corporate interests.

4. **UOG304**: Which statement comes closer to your view? We should expand our exploration and production of oil, coal, and natural gas to reduce energy costs, especially for poorer families **OR** We should focus on developing clean alternative energy sources (like solar and wind) to protect the environment, even if it means higher energy costs.

5. **UOG305**: Which statement comes closer to your view? The minimum wage is too low and we should raise it **OR** Raising the minimum wage would hurt the economy and we should keep it where it is for now.

6. **UOG306**: Which statement comes closer to your view? Local police forces have become too militarized in recent years and should scale back military-style tactics and equipment **OR** Local police forces have needed to become militarized to deal with threats from drug dealers, terrorists, and other criminals.

7. **UOG307**: Which statement comes closer to your view? The US should play an active role in world affairs to protect American interests and promote humanitarian goals, using military force when necessary **OR** The US already does too much to try to solve the world's problems, and should concentrate on problems here at home.

8. **UOG308**: Which statement comes closer to your view? Free trade is a good thing because it improves economic efficiency and lowers costs **OR** Free trade does more harm than good because it costs jobs and lowers wages.

9. **UOG309**: Which of the following statements best describes your view about the role of Christianity in public life? We should not let any specific religious teachings influence public policy **OR** We should look to Christian doctrine on helping the poor and caring for the weak-but not on matters of private morality-to guide public policy **OR** Our country was founded on Judeo-Christian principles and our public policy should reflect most Christian teachings on public and private morality **OR** Christianity should be the official religion of the United States.

10. **UOG310**: Should bakers, florists, and other private businesses be required by the government to serve gay customers getting married, even if participation in the ceremony violates their religious beliefs? Yes, discrimination against gay customers should be illegal **OR** No, I support gay rights, but the government should not force business owners to violate their religious beliefs **OR** No, I believe gay marriage is immoral and support conscience protections for business owners.

11. **UOG311**: Which statement comes closer to your view? Racial discrimination is the main reason why many blacks can't get ahead these days **OR** Blacks who can't get ahead are mostly responsible for own condition.

12. **UOG312**: Which statement comes closer to your view? Racial prejudice is no higher in the South compared to other regions of the country, as seen with the high levels of racial segregation in Northern cities **OR** Racial prejudice remains higher in the South than other regions of the country due to the lasting effects of racist laws and attitudes.

13. **UOG313** [Cosmopolitanism]: We are interested in the kinds of things people do for recreation. Please tell us a little bit about yourself. In the last 10 years, have you...

    (a) Been to Europe or Australia?
    (b) Traveled to Canada or Mexico?
    (c) Visited Asia, Africa, or South America?
    (d) Gone to an Indian restaurant?
    (e) Had Japanese food?

14. **UOG314**: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

    (a) Immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing and health care.
    (b) Health care is a basic human right. We have a moral duty to provide health care to all American citizens, regardless of the costs involved.
    (c) There is a link between childhood vaccinations and autism.
    (d) The government should do more to help needy Americans, even if it means going deeper into debt.
    (e) Government institutions are controlled largely by elite outside interests.
    (f) Society is better off if people make marriage and having children a priority.

(g) Business corporations make too much profit.

(h) Public housing developments for poor families should be integrated throughout cities because it increases racial diversity, even if it disrupts traditional and more affluent neighborhoods.

(i) In national politics, nothing happens by accident.

(j) We should prohibit federal funding for religious charity organizations that don't have anti-gay discrimination policies for services like adoption, even if this leads to cuts in services for the poor.

(k) Large retail stores like Wal-Mart are good for local communities (especially the poor) because they provide cheaper products.

(l) Nothing is at it seems. Politicians often lie, deflect blame and find other ways to look innocent.

(m) We should enact a universal health insurance system where all medical costs are paid for by the government, financed by raising taxes on middle and upper-class citizens.

(n) In national politics, you can see patterns, designs and secret activities everywhere once you know where to look.

15. **UOG315**: How much trust do you have in each of the following institutions to do the right thing?

(a) The CIA (Central Intelligence Agency)

(b) The military

(c) The Supreme Court

(d) Big business

(e) Organized religion

(f) Labor unions

16. **UOG316** [Postmaterialism]: For a nation, it is not always possible to obtain everything one might wish. Several goals are listed. If you had to choose among them, which two seem most desirable to you? Please rank your top two choices.

(a) Maintaining order in the nation

(b) Fighting rising prices

(c) Giving people more say in government decisions

(d) Protecting freedom of speech

A.6 Common Items Used to Bridge the 2014 and 2015 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies

Number of response categories, 2014 CCES variable ID, and 2015 CCES variable ID in parentheses:

partyid (7; pid7;)
ideology (7; CC334A)
voted2012 (2; CC14_316)
romneyvote (2; CC14_317)
news_interest (4; newsint)
knowledge_correcthousesenate (2; CC14_309a & CC14_309b)
age (4; birthyr)
female (2; gender)
education (3; educ)
black (2; race)
hispanic (2; race)
georegion (4; region)
income (4; faminc)
homeownership (2; ownhome)
stockownership (2; investor)
unionmember (2; union & unionhh)
religiosity.Qs (4; pew_bornagain, pew_religimp, pew_churatd, & pew_prayer)
repealACA (2; CC14_324_2)
environment.Qs (4; CC14_326_1, CC14_326_2, CC14_326_3, & CC14_326_4)
balancebudget_firstchoice (3; CC14_329a)
balancebudget_lastresort (3; CC14_329b)
guncontrol.Qs (4; CC14_320a, CC14_320b, CC14_320c, CC14_320d, & CC14_320e)
immigration.Qs (4; CC14_322_1, CC14_322_2, CC14_322_3, CC14_322_4, & CC14_322_5)
abortion.Qs (4; CC14_323_1, CC14_323_3, CC14_323_4, & CC14_323_5)
favorgaymarriage (2; CC14_327)

A.7 Code to Apply Estimated LCA Configuration to the 2015 Cooperative Congressional Election Study Data

Implemented in R *using functionality from the* poLCA *library:*

```
mframe <- model.frame(formula.cces2014, cces2015.data, na.action = na.pass)
y <- model.response(mframe)
y[is.na(y)] <- 0
N <- nrow(y)
J <- ncol(y)
R <- 6  # nclasses
K.j <- t(matrix(apply(y, 2, max)))
prior <- matrix(lcaresult.cces2014$P, nrow = N, ncol = R, byrow = TRUE)
vp <- poLCA:::poLCA.vectorize(lcaresult.cces2014$probs)
rgivy <- poLCA:::poLCA.postClass.C(prior, vp, y)
predclass.cces2015 <- unlist(apply(rgivy, 1, which.max))
```

A.8 2016 Presidential Primary Candidate Preference by Latent Class

2015 Cooperative Congressional Election Study

Figure 21: Most preferred presidential candidate by latent class (based on feeling thermometer ratings).